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Abstract
RAMS (Reliability, Availability, Maintenance, Safety) requirements are utmost im-
portant for safety-critical systems like railroad infrastructure and signaling systems,
and often imposed by law or other government regulations. Fault tree analysis (FTA,
for short) is a widely applied industry standard for RAMS analysis [1, 2], and is of-
ten one of the techniques preferred by railways organizations [3]. FTA yields sys-
tem availability and reliability, and can be used for critical path analysis. It can
however not yet deal with a pressing aspect of railroad engineering: maintenance.
While railroad infrastructure providers are focusing more and more on managing
cost/performance ratios, RAMS can be considered as the performance specification,
and maintenance the main cost driver. Methods facilitating the management of this
ratio are still very uncommon.
This paper presents a powerful, flexible and transparent technique to incorporate a
maintenance aspects in fault tree analysis, based on stochastic model checking. We
are able to analyze and compare different maintenance strategies (such as age-based,
clock-based and condition-dependent maintenance) and their impact on reliability and
availability metrics. Thus, we facilitate the trade off between cost and RAMS perfor-
mance.
To keep the underlying state space of our state space small, we deploy two aggres-
sive state space reduction techniques, namely compositional aggregation, and smart
semantics. We illustrate our approach on several existing, large fault tree models in a
case study from Movares, a major RAMS consultancy firm in the Netherlands.
Keywords: Dynamic fault trees, maintenance, availability, reliability, cost, recovery.
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1 Introduction
Fault trees (FTs) are a wide-spread, and often preferred [1, 2], technique for RAMS
analysis. A fault tree specifies the failure behaviour of a system in terms of its com-
ponents. The leaves of the tree represent component failures; the gates indicate how
component failures propagate through the system, and lead to system level failures.
Fault trees currently only support elementary maintenance aspects, e.g., in the sim-
ple repair rates model, all faults of a component are repaired with the same speed. The
railway application context, however, demands highly advanced maintenance models
supporting condition-dependent strategies for preventive, corrective, clock- and age-
based maintenance, inspection, monitoring, etc. In case of multiple failures, decision
strategies need to specify which component(s) to repair first. In addition, maintenance
costs are pivotal. FTA cannot yet cope with these advanced maintenance aspects.
In this paper, we equip (dynamic) FTs with maintenance aspects, yielding a power-
ful framework that enables one to compare the effect of different maintenance strate-
gies on the availability, reliability, and recovery speed. This is achieved in a number
of steps: First, we extend the expressive power of FTs with maintenance aspects such
as maintenance actions like repair or replacement of components.
Second, we provide a formal semantics of this FT extension. Our semantics pro-
vides an unambiguous meaning to each FT, and acts as a blueprint for analysis and
tool-support. A rucial aspect of our semantics is its compositionality: the semantics
of a complex FT is given as the combination of the semantics of its elements (i.e. gates
and leaves). The main advantage is that reduction techniques, simplifying the com-
ponent FTs to accelerate their analysis, can be applied in a component-based manner
[4]. This drastically improves the calability of the approach as it significantly reduces
peak-memory consumption. The underlying mathematical model that we use for the
semantics is input/output-interactive Markov chains (I/O-IMCs) [5]. An important
contribution of the current paper is that we further exploit the reduction techniques
by introducing smart semantics. Smart semantics, which can be seen as a refinement
of the interface-based minimization technique that was successfully deployed in [6],
automatically tailors the semantics of a FT element (i.e. underlying of I/O-IMC) to the
context where it is used. So, rather than using a generic I/O-IMC model to represent a
FT element, we obtain a smaller one depending on the surrounding FT gates.
Finally, we report on advanced analysis techniques that allow for determining a
number of interesting FT measures such as expected lifetime (what is the expected
time until a certain scenario occurs?), long-run average behaviours (which fraction
of time is the system in a given good state?), and timed reachability (what is the
probability to reach a certain scenario a given deadline?) [7]. The key to determining
these measures is the exploitation of stochastic model checking [8, Chapter 10], an
innovative technique heavily used by hardware manufacturers. The scientific core of
our work is the extension, refinement, and tailoring of SMC techniques to the analysis
of I/O-IMCs.
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We illustrate our approach by means of a study of determining the availability of
railway safety mechanisms of a railroad trajectory at one of the major crossing-points
in the Netherlands between north-south and east-west railway traffic. We present the
results using a prototypical software tool-chain and compare the impact of two differ-
ent maintenance strategies.
2 RAMS and FTA for railways: state-of-the-art in prac-
tice
Railroad systems are bound by high performance standards. In the Netherlands for
instance, the government poses severe financial consequences for the companies in-
volved in railroad transportation and maintenance when train service is delayed or
disrupted too often or for too long, or when other performance objectives are violated.
These performance objectives, imposed by Dutch government, are stated as quantita-
tive requirements on the number of delayed or cancelled train services.
Likewise, safety of passengers, train/maintenance personnel, residents and passers-
by is crucial. Quantitative requirements are imposed by Dutch government on all
safety-critical systems and subsystems, such as automatic train protection. Here, the
engineering of systems includes a demonstration that the quantitative safety require-
ments are met. Without a convincing quantitative proof, new systems are not allowed
to be implemented and used in the Dutch railroads.
In order to assess the performance of a railway system or subsystem, Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA) is the method preferred by the Dutch Railinfrastructure manager Pro-
Rail [3]. FTA is a topdown, deductive approach to determine the causes for undesired
events (failures) and calculate the expected performance (frequency of failures, total
down time, etc.) [9]. In our experience with the application FTA to railway engi-
neering projects, there are some limitations to obtaining trustworthy and truly useful
performance expectancy results.
In particular, there is a strong relationship between preventive maintenance and
failure rates on the one hand, and between corrective maintenance and the repair rate
on the other hand: The likelihood of a failure occurring is closely related to the amount
and quality of preventive maintenance being performed. For failure data that is being
monitored, this is usually unknown. Moreover, preventive maintenance practice may
vary, e.g. leading to more failures when replacement intervals become longer. Like-
wise, the repair rate is closely related to corrective maintenance and depends on spare
parts, reachability of the components, repair or replacement strategies, etc. It would be
very useful to explore these relationships and optimize on the balance between costs
and performance for different preventive and corrective maintenance strategies.
There is currently no way in FTA to model neither the relationship between main-
tenance activities and the failure and repair rates, nor the costs involved. Tools for
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) do facilitate this, but have the drawback
that no conditional relationship between basic events is possible (only OR gates).
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Finally, FTA can be used to determine the expected performance when the numbers
for the basic events are known. However, in order to optimize performance and/or
costs, it is very useful to perform the calculation with unknown parameters in basic
events. In case of a tolerable hazard rate analysis, the analysis is performed in the
reverse direction: the failure rate of the top event (an undesired safety incident) is
a given quantitative requirement and none of the failure rates are yet known. By
dividing the budget of the top failure rate over the tree structure, failure rates for the
basic events may be induced which are then used as quantitative requirements for the
engineering process of the functionality involved.
This paper provides significant steps to overcome these drawbacks: by incorpo-
rating maintenance aspects in fault tree analysis, we can explore the relationships
between maintenance costs and system performance. Moveover, stochastic model
checking approach is able to perform parametric analysis. This is currently not imple-
mented in our DFT analysis tools, but is an important topic for further research.
3 Fault Trees and Dynamic fault trees
A fault tree (FT) is a tree (or rather a directed acyclic graph, since subtrees can be
shared) describing the failure propagation of a system in terms of the failure of its
components. The leaves of a FT are labeled with basic events and the non-leaves with
gates. The root is called top-level event.
Static fault trees allow AND, OR and VOTING gates. Dynamic fault trees (DFT)
[1] extend static ones with a number of gates, to model common patterns in reliabil-
ity engineering: functional dependencies can be specified via the FDEP gate; spare
management via the SPARE gate; and sequencing via the PAND gate. Thus, static
fault trees model and propagate the occurrence of faults, and dynamic fault trees take
into account also the order in which failures occur. In this way, DFTs allow more
convenient and compact modeling of failure behavior.
3.1 DFT elements
Example. The DFT depicted in Figure 3 represents the (simplified) failure behaviour
of a railroad level crossing. The level crossing consists of three subsystems: the sen-
sors, the barriers and the controller. As indicated by the top-level OR-gate (named
Level crossing failure), the level crossing will fail if either one of these subsystems
fails. There are in total four redundant sensors. The sensor system fails if at least two
out of the four sensors will fail, as is modelled by the 2 out of 4 VOTING gate (named
Sensors fail). Further there can be a detection problem due to a disconnection of the
cables. In that case, all sensors will become unavailable. This is modelled by the
FDEP gate (named No detection): the trigger (named Disconnection) will cause the
failure of all its dependent events (Sensor1, . . . ,Sensor4). Finally, the barriers fail if
either the main and spare motor fails, modelled by the SPARE gate (named Motors),
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Figure 1: DFT for modeling a simple level crossing gate failure.
or if the switch and then a motor fails, modelled by the PAND gate (named Switching
unit).
Basic events. A basic event (BE) represents the failure behaviour of a basic system
component, and will be graphically displayed by a circle. A BE can be in three differ-
ent modes: dormant, active and failed. The dormant mode indicates that a component
is not in use, but acts as a stand-by or spare; the active mode indicates that the compo-
nent is in use and is functional; the failed mode indicates that the component is out of
order. In active mode, a component fails with a certain failure rate λ, which is the pa-
rameter of an exponential distribution. In other words, the mean failure time is given
by 1
λ
. In dormant mode, the failure rate is decreased by a dormancy factor α ∈ [0, 1].
In case α = 0 the BE cannot fail (cold BE) and in case α = 1 the failure rate is the
same as in active mode (warm BE). Alternatively, the failure behaviour can be speci-
fied by a phase-type distribution. This is a probability distribution constructed out of
several exponential distributions and is capable of supporting any actual distribution
up to a given precision [10].
inputs
output
(a) OR
inputs
output
(b) AND
k/n
inputs
output
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inputs
output
(d) PAND
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Primary
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dummy output
trigger
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Figure 2: Dynamic fault tree gates.
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Gates. A gate expresses how component failures induce a system failure. Gates
consist of one or more inputs, and one output. Figure 2 depicts the DFT gates:
(a) The OR gate fails whenever at least one input fails.
(b) The AND gate fails whenever all of it inputs fail.
(c) The VOTING gate fails whenever at least k out of n inputs fail.
(d) The PAND (priority AND) gate fails whenever all of its inputs fail from left to
right. It does not fail if some of its inputs fail in a different order.
(e) The SPARE gate consists of a primary input and one or more spare inputs. At
system start, the primary is active, and the spares are in standby mode. When
the primary input fails, one of the spare inputs is activated and replaces the
primary. If no more spares are available, the SPARE gate fails. Note that a
spare component can be shared among several spare gates.
(f) The FDEP (functional dependency) gate consists of one trigger event and sev-
eral dependent events. When the trigger event occurs, all dependent events fail.
The FDEP has a ”dummy” output, which is ignored in calculations.
4 Maintenance
Current FT methods [11, 12] — and their analysis techniques — are focused on the
failure propagation of individual components until a top-level event is triggered. Al-
though this aspect is of pivotal importance to RAMS analysis, the maintenance of
system components and its influence on the system’s failure behaviour is highly rele-
vant. To that end, we introduce a DFT extension which captures maintenance activities
such as component repairs. This is done in two steps: First we extend the behaviour
of BEs, and then introduce a new module which handles the maintenance tasks. In the
following we informally describe their behaviour.
4.1 Repairable basic events
In the standard DFT representation, once a BE fails, it is out of service and not con-
sidered any further. However, by repairing this BE and re-using it, the failure of the
system could be temporarily prevented. Multiple repairs may further improve the
system’s availability. Such component repairs are not captured by the current DFT
formalism. To include this functionality for BEs, we distinguish two modes: active
and inactive. This distinction is important, since a failure of an activated BE can have
a different impact on the system than a failure of an inactive component, e.g., they
may incur different detection times until the failure of the BE is recognised. Further,
after repairing the component it is important to know whether the BE was in active or
in inactive mode to specify its role in the system. For example, consider a failure of a
spare component. After its failure another spare component will be used if available.
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Figure 3: Repair extension for maintainable components.
Thus, after the failed spare is repaired, it should change from active to inactive mode.
On the contrary, if the spare was in inactive mode it should stay inactive.
The incorporation of a repair functionality in BEs is done using a repair module
(RM). The RM listens for the failure of the BE and on detecting a failure sends out a
repair request. On receiving a message that a successful repair is carried out, the RM
sends the BE an up signal indicating that the BE can be re-activated. This modularised
architecture allows for a high flexibility in describing the components’ maintenance
procedure. Hence, depending on the defined procedure for a BE, we can plug in the
corresponding RM. Further, in case the BE cannot be repaired we obtain the standard
BE. A repairable BE and a simple RM are depicted in Figure 4.1 in terms of an I/O-
IMC.
4.2 Repair unit
A so-called repair unit (RU) is exploited to determine the manner of repair as well as
the repair’s random duration. The activation of the repair process for a BE is triggered
by the repair module RM of the BE. The RU then describes the actual maintenance
procedure. After the RU has executed its process, it will send a repaired signal to the
RM of the BE. To each BE a RU can be assigned. Hence, a RU will operate on one
or more BEs. If more than one BE is assigned to a RU, the repair strategy — what
is the order of repairing the failed components? — becomes an important factor. It is
possible to directly model the RU with a certain strategy such as first come first serve.
A more generic approach is to have non-deterministic choices, or assign priorities.
5 Semantics
In this section we describe our approach to model DFTs in a compositional and smart
way. We first explain a more generic model, which can be used to include more ex-
pressiveness into the DFT and then describe optimizations regarding pattern matching
in DFTs. For the formal encoding of the DFT semantics we use input-output interac-
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Figure 4: Graphical overview of the compositional aggregation of DFT models.
tive Markov chains (I/O-IMCs) which are an extension of interactive Markov Chains
(IMCs) [5] by including input and output signals into the action set. An I/O-IMC
consists out of a number of states which are connected via two types of transitions,
interactive and Markovian. The interactive transitions are labelled with signals, e.g.
“fail !” which is used for sending a failure signal to other components. The Markovian
transitions are labelled with rates λ representing an exponential distributed delay with
parameter λ.
5.1 Compositional aggregation
Compositional aggregation is an intelligent way of translating the DFT into an I/O-
IMC while keeping the state space small. This method is exploited in the DFTCalc
tool-chain [13], which is capable of computing several quantitative metrics on DFTs.
Compositional aggregation, as depicted in Figure 4, starts with transforming each DFT
element into an I/O-IMC. Then the obtained I/O-IMCs are iteratively composed in the
following manner: Take two I/O-IMCs, compose them, hide all signals that are no
longer needed for synchronisation, and then minimise the composition. This process
continues until a single I/O-IMC remains. The order of the aggregation process heav-
ily influences the maximal number of intermideate states, and is determined by a smart
heuristic [14]. Remark that under different heuristics the resulting number of states at
the end is the same. Compositional aggregation yields reductions upto several orders
of magnitude [4] and in theory may yield exponential savings.
5.2 Smart semantics
In FT modelling a lot of redundancy is added to the FT to understand the systems
behaviour. For example, instead of connecting all components leading to a system
failure to one OR gate, they are grouped in several ”OR-groups”. This is important
for the human perception of the FT, but for the analysis this behaviour can be simpli-
fied. Therefore, we introduce the notion of smart semantics. This is based on pattern
matchings in the FT as well as finding equivalent behaviour of components. For exam-
ple, if we analyse a FT with a group of independentOR gates, we can aggregate those
gates into one OR gate for the quantitative analysis, respectively for AND gates. This
holds also for independent FDEP gates, since those can be translated into OR gates.
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Figure 5: Comparison of 2 simplified BEs as IMCs.
Further, the aggregation of similar BEs will significantly reduce the state space. Con-
sidering a simplified BE it can be in two modes, active and failed. By considering now
n BEs in parallel, we would obtain 2n many configurations. If those BEs describe now
the same failure and repair behaviour, we can reduce the possible configurations down
to n + 1 by only considering how many BEs are already failed. Figure 5 depicts this
for 2 BEs. Note that the treatment of gates that impose a certain order such as PAND
and SPARE or and explicit counting as VOTING are more difficult to aggregate and
are not considered at this point.
6 Analysis
Once the underlying I/O-IMC of a given extended DFT is obtained, the next step is to
use efficient techniques for the quantitative evaluation.
6.1 Non-determinism yields bounds
As described above, the compositional semantics of DFTs yields an I/O-IMC. This
model is a proper extension of continuous-time Markov chains (CTMCs), the model
that is used for standard (mostly static) FT analysis. The major difference is the pos-
sible presence of non-determinism in IMCs. A CTMC is fully probabilistic, that is
to say, being in a state the next state is determined by means of a random experi-
ment. Technically this is due to the fact that CTMCs do only contain rate-labelled
transitions, and no action-transitions. For (extended) DFTs, action transitions are nat-
ural representations of (repairs and) failure occurrences. As a result, non-determinism
may occur, i.e., a state with multiple outgoing action-transitions. We stress that this
phenomenon can also occur in standard DFTs, see [4], and thus as such is not a result
of considering repairs..
The possible presence of non-determinism yields that we deal with stochastic de-
cision processes. In fact, IMCs are very similar to continuous-time Markov decision
processes (CTMDPs) [15]. In such models, probabilities of events are not uniquely de-
termined, but instead subject to the resolution of the non-determinism. For instance,
the probability to move to a certain state, e.g., the state in which the top-level ele-
ment fails, depends on the non-deterministic repair strategy that is taken when more
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than one component simultaneously has failed. The analysis of such models therefore
yields upper and lower bounds. For any possible resolution of the non-determinism,
the actual probability falls within these bounds. These bounds coincide if there is no
non-determinism (as in the case study later on).
6.2 Quantitative measures
The quantitative analysis of I/O-IMCs (and thus maintenance DFTs) concentrates on
three measures:
1. Expected time: what is the expected duration until some goal state is reached?
2. Long-run average: what is the fraction of time the DFT stays in a certain state
in the long run?
3. Timed reachability: what is the probability to reach a certain state within a given
deadline?
As stated above, all three analyses yield bounds, e.g., the maximal and minimal ex-
pected time. Example expected time objectives are: what is the expected duration
between two successive failures of a switch?, or what is the expected time until a first
failure of a BE? Long-run average measures are the pendant to stationary distribu-
tions of Markov chains. They are not of much interest for standard DFTs, as DFTs
are acyclic, and thus will end up in a certain state, typically the failure of the top-level
event, in the long run with probability one. For our extended DFTs though, compo-
nents can be repaired, and long-run averages become highly relevant. Relevant prop-
erties are e.g., what is the fraction of time that several switches along a rail track have
simultaneously failed? In our case study, we will cover several of such long-run aver-
age measures. Finally, timed reachability properties are of use for determining not just
the expected time until a certain scenario occurs, but to check whether the probability
that a certain event, e.g., the disruption of a railway crossing, happens within the next
two days is at most 10−6. Timed reachability probabilities are the natural counterpart
to transient probabilities in Markov chains. The computation of long-run averages and
expected time objectives relies on linear programming (plus some graph analysis) and
can be done in polynomial time in the size of the IMC. Timed reachability is much
more involved — like transient analysis of Markov chains has a higher time complex-
ity than determining stationary distributions — and relies on discretisation. For details
on the algorithms we refer to [7].
7 Case study
To demonstrate our approach, we analyse a set of fault tree models constructed by
Movares to carry out RAMS analysis of a major railroad corridor. In this paper, we
use anonymised data and altered fault tree models.
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The main focus of the case study lies on the RAMS analysis on the railway safety
systems of a railroad trajectory at one of the major crossing-points in the Netherlands
between north-south and east-west railway traffic. The goal of the analysis is to verify
that the rail trajectory fulfils the railway system specifications. Here, the focus lies
on the availability of the systems on the rail trajectory. The failure occurrences are
defined by three failure categories:
Category I. Severe disruption in both directions, such that no train can ride.
Category II. Severe disruption in one direction, such that no train can ride.
Category III. Minor disruption which leads to dis-punctuality.
Our experiments have been conducted on several DFTs, describing major functional-
ities of the safety system of the railroad trajectory. The analysis includes only rail-
side safety equipment such as signalling, train detection, relay cabinets, high voltage
cabinets and similar. Note that we use the following abbreviations in the fault tree
descriptions:
• ATB: short for “automatische treinbenvloeding” which is a dutch automatic train
protection system.
• GRS: which is a “General Railway Section Company” track circuit system.
• PSSSL: short for “prikspanningspoorstroomloop” which is a peak voltage track
circuit system.
The analysis focuses on the availability of the safety system under two different main-
tenance strategies using our smart semantics approach. The results are listed in Ta-
ble 1.
7.1 Fault trees
The FTs used in this case study are all static, hence only containing OR, AND and
VOTING gates. This is due to the limitations of the currently used techniques in FTA
as described in Section 2. Note that our method is capable of handling the PAND,
SPARE and FDEP gates. It is future work, to obtain more succinct FTs of railroad
models using these dynamic gates.
7.1.1 Category III failure
Failure in the authorization. This failure can be induced by several operational
failures on the rail trajectory. Those are divided in five different failure events:
• The first event is induced by a signalling failure on the rail trajectory. This can
be caused by any signal light failing or by failure of the cables.
• The second event is an unjust occupation. This failure is induced by wrong
occupation signals due to a failure of the train detection.
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• The third event is an impossibility to operate a switch, where it is in correct
position. This failure is induced by a failure of the train detection.
• The fourth event is an unjust closing of a level crossing. This failure is induced
by a failure of detection, a relay cabinet, or of a high voltage cabinet.
• The fifth event is a faulty ATB code. This failure is induced by a failure of the
ATB functionality of a railway section.
The whole FT consists out of 40 BEs connected over 6 OR gates.
7.1.2 Category II failure
Failure of a switch. The failure of a single switch on the rail trajectory will block
one rail direction and thus induces a category II failure. The corresponding FT consists
out of three different OR events:
• The first event is the unavailability of a currently operated switch. A failure of a
switch is again divided in three occurrences. The first occurrence is a failure on
the rail trajectory on a currently used switch. The second occurrence is a failure
in one of the stations on a currently used switch. The third occurrence is the
failure of the cables in the station connected to a currently operated switch.
• The second event is the unreliability of a switch. This is similar to the first event,
with the difference that all currently not operated switches are considered.
• The third event describes a failure of a release approval for shunting. This hap-
pens if either one of the control knobs fails or one of the cables fails.
The whole FT consists out of 27 BEs connected over 9 OR gates.
7.1.3 Category I failure
Failure of several relay cabinets. This failure is induced by a disruption of several
relays on an operated track. This can happen by an actual defect of the relay cabinets,
a defect of the high voltage cabinets or a defect in the power cables. A failure on
the operated track will occur if either two different failures occur, e.g. a cable fails
and a relay cabinet fails, or if two of the same category are failing, e.g. two high
voltage cabinets are down. The whole FT consists out of 30 BEs connected over
4 VOTING gates and 4 OR gates. There exists also another FT with 66 BEs. An
abstract illustration of this FT is given in Figure 6.
Failure of several switches. The failure of several switches will induce a category
I failure. The FT lifts the failures of the previous described FT to the context of
switches. Hence the failures leading to a failure of several switches are given by: The
GRS detection is failing, or the PSSSL detection is failing, or a cable fails. The whole
FT consists out of 26 BEs connected over 4 VOTING gates and 4 OR gates.
Disruption of a level crossing. The failure of a level crossing will induce a cat-
egory I failure since the whole rail trajectory must be closed in this situation. The
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Figure 6: Illustration of one of the category I FTs.
level crossing will fail if the operating system fails as well as a wrongly activation
of the crossing occurs. A wrongly activation can be induced by several detection or
component failures. In total they are grouped in five events. The first event is a GRS
detection failure. The second event is a PSSSL detection failure. The third event is an
relay cabinet outage. The fourth event is a failure of one of the several cables. The
fifth event is induced by a defect of the level crossing installation itself. All events can
either occur in a station or on the midsection. The whole FT consists out of 58 BEs
connected over 8 OR gates and one AND gate. There exists also another FT with 350
BEs.
7.2 Experimental results
We compute the models using two different repair strategies: in the first strategy, each
component has a dedicated repair procedure, i.e., each component can be repaired at
any time. This is the strategy Movares has considered for their analysis. A second
strategy we consider is based on one repair per group of components. This is more
realistic in practice: dedicated repairs are expensive, so in general repair units (per-
sonnel, spare parts, etc) are allocated to groups of similar components. Note that we
consider an average repair time of 2 hours per component.
The results of our computations are listed in Table 1 and were conducted on a dual
core Linux machine with 2GB of RAM. Note that strategy 1 refers to the model where
all BEs have a dedicated repair and strategy 2 where a repair is assigned to a group
of BEs. Further, the unavailability numbers are fractions, e.g. for the failure of a
switch the system will be unavailable in 0.01926% of the time in the long run. By
13
Unavailability Computation
System # BEs # States Strategy 1 Strategy 2 time
Failure in the authorization 40 12393 2.8 · 10−6 2.8 · 10−6 1 sec
Failure of a switch 27 90720 1.926 · 10−4 1.926 · 10−4 88 sec
Failure of several relay cabinets 30 46656 8.71 · 10−12 1.2 · 10−11 3 sec
Failure of several relay cabinets 66 2985983 4.44 · 10−11 6.3 · 10−11 6 min
Failure of several switches 26 14400 4.44 · 10−9 7.15 · 10−9 5 sec
Disruption of a level crossing 58 200447 6.8 · 10−8 6.8 · 10−8 18 sec
Disruption of a level crossing 350 11653631 2 · 10−7 2 · 10−7 30 min
Table 1: Results of the experiments.
observing the unavailability column of strategy 1 and 2, it stands out that the results
only differ for 3 FTs. Further the variance is rather low. However, this shows that even
with less possible repairs, the availability of the system is only affected marginally. In
total, under both strategies, the system is available during 99.98% of the time in the
long run. Thus, for the considered rail trajectory even a more relaxed maintenance
strategy in terms of component repairs suffice to guarantee the same availability of the
system. Note that the actual data of the FTs from Movares are confidential and cannot
be displayed.
8 Conclusion
This paper presents an approach to integrate fault tree analysis and maintenance in the
context of railroad systems. We presented a powerful and extensible technique based
on SMC and their experimental validation.
Our technique paves the way for two important extensions, namely costs and pa-
rameters: Both are pivotal in facilitating the highly demanded cost/performance ratio
for railroad management. Further the tailoring of SMC techniques and their integra-
tion in FTA is a natural next step.
Another important direction for further research is the automatic synthesis of opti-
mal strategies. Our results show the applicability and usefulness of our general frame-
work. However, the strategies used in this paper were still quite simple.
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